This chapter compares the constitutional courts of Ecuador and Bolivia under the Andean constitutions of 2008 and 2009. It first examines the guarantees of judicial independence and the selection of judges (competitive examinations in Ecuador, direct popular election in Bolivia), asking whether the idea of a reflective judiciary, sensitive to gender balance and indigenous representation, has taken root. It then analyses the review of constitutionality and conventionality exercised by the two courts. Both systems prove to belong to the pantocratic model of constitutional justice in its most enhanced variant, although with lesser intensity in Ecuador.
Il modello di giustizia costituzionale pantocratico in Ecuador e Bolivia
Enrico Buono
2021-01-01
Abstract
This chapter compares the constitutional courts of Ecuador and Bolivia under the Andean constitutions of 2008 and 2009. It first examines the guarantees of judicial independence and the selection of judges (competitive examinations in Ecuador, direct popular election in Bolivia), asking whether the idea of a reflective judiciary, sensitive to gender balance and indigenous representation, has taken root. It then analyses the review of constitutionality and conventionality exercised by the two courts. Both systems prove to belong to the pantocratic model of constitutional justice in its most enhanced variant, although with lesser intensity in Ecuador.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


