Balanced Budget Objectives and the Role of Executives: The cases of Italy, Spain and US states

The economic crisis and the institutional evolution in the economic governance of the EU induced several processes of constitutional mutation at a domestic level. In the selected cases, this paper suggests that the introduction of balanced budget objective and vertical integration between the national and the supranational levels after the financial crisis worked together in a process of centralisation. The comparison with the US states case helps to highlight those processes in a long- term perspective. It seems to have a dual nature, causing both a reshaping of the relationships between the centre and the periphery and also increasing the role of the executive with respect to that of the legislative. An analysis of the cases of the US states, Spain and Italy indicates that this process provoked the creation of a centre of budget decisions for the overall internal system. The need for responsible in-budget management, which is a result of the development of intergovernmental relationships and of compliance with constitutional constraints, could be described as a long-term trend