«Rien de personnel». Notes sur la question de l'acceptio personarum dans la théologie scolastique

In the theological tradition, the notion of ‘acceptio personarum’ is opposed to that of merit: respect of persons is referred to when, in the conferring of a benefit, the beneficiary is singled out, not on the basis of any so to speak objective merits, but on the basis of the subjective disposition of the benefactor. The article considers the way in which the notion is used in the Scholastic debate over the relation between divine grace and human merit, focusing mainly on the different positions of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. In order to preserve God from the allegation of ‘acceptio personarum’, while at the same time maintaining the principle of the absolute gratuity of grace, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent adopt different strategies. Aquinas, who seems to be more faithful to Augustine's mature position, affirms that, without causing offense to distributive justice, God can indeed treat individuals unequally when dispensing grace, since grace, being something that is not earned, has nothing whatever to do with distributive justice. Henry, on the other hand, proposes that even if there is no merit which as such could make a person worthy of receiving grace, and so bring grace within the bounds of distributive justice, human beings nevertheless have a certain ‘congruence’ that God cannot just set aside. Rather than acting arbitrarily, God takes into account (although without being obliged to do so) not just persons as such, but the particular conditions in which they find themselves (their congruence).