La revoca della cittadinanza tra dovere di fedeltà e diritto ad avere diritti

In the context of the crisis of multiculturalism and international terrorism, several countries have introduced or reinforced existing rules providing for citizenship revocation. The US Supreme Court, since the 1958 Trop v. Dulles case, deemed the withdrawal of citizenship to be in contrast with the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments and the right to citizenship, according to the VIII and the XIV amendments, on the basis of the principle of human dignity. However, as an alternative to the right to citizenship, the common law doctrine of citizenship as a common bond between the citizen and the political community, involving reciprocal rights and duties, is often considered as a justification for revocation powers. This doctrine is based on the medieval idea of citizenship as allegiance between the subject and the monarch, introduced in the common law since the Calvin’s case in 1608. This paper argues that, in the case-law of the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, this idea of citizenship is ambiguous and under-defined, thus paving the way for human rights violations and discriminations, breaking, in the end, the principle of human dignity.