The paper focuses on the thesis advanced by Constantino Esposito in the third chapter of "The Nihilism of Our Time", according to which “intelligence” is one of the prominent factors within contemporary nihilism. In particular, the article investigates the tendency of evolutionary-based reductionism, which “seeks to solve the problem of the self by eliminating the question, that is, by denying the fact that it is a problem”. To this end, a historical-reconstructive approach will be taken, tracing how the nature of consciousness and intelligence has been thematized by evolutionary thought, from Darwin to the most recent positions in the philosophy of mind. The survey will be carried out in three stages: 1) the origin of human intelligence and consciousness according to Darwin, who, although from his peculiar materialistic perspective, conceives of it as a “mystery”; 2) the epiphenomenalist and emergentist paradigm in the thought of G.H. Lewes and T.H. Huxley, among the first to apply Darwinian categories to the study of the human mind; 3) the contemporary reductionist and computational paradigm in the neo-Darwinian thought of authors such as R. Dawkins and D.C. Dennett. In the conclusions, an attempt will be made to ascertain whether something unthought of or, in Esposito’s words, “something irreducible to the great reduction” remains in this parable.
Il contributo si propone di mettere a fuoco la tesi avanzata da Costantino Esposito nel terzo capitolo de "Il nichilismo del nostro tempo" secondo cui quello dell’“intelligenza” è uno dei fattori di primo piano all’interno del nichilismo contemporaneo. In particolare, si vuole indagare la tendenza del riduzionismo di matrice evoluzionistica, che «cerca di risolvere il problema dell’io eliminando la domanda, cioè negando il fatto che sia un problema». A tal fine si adotterà un approccio storico-ricostruttivo, ripercorrendo i modi in cui la natura della coscienza e dell’intelligenza è stata tematizzata dal pensiero evoluzionistico, da Darwin fino alle più recenti posizioni in filosofia della mente. La ricognizione si svolgerà in tre momenti: 1) l’origine dell’intelligenza e della coscienza umane secondo Darwin, che pur dalla sua peculiare prospettiva “materialistica” la concepisce come un «mistero»; 2) l’imporsi del paradigma emergentistico ed epifenomenalistico nel pensiero di T.H. Huxley e G.H. Lewes, tra i primi ad applicare le categorie darwiniane allo studio della mente; 3) l’approdo al riduzionismo e al computazionalismo contemporanei nel pensiero neodarwiniano di autori come R. Dawkins e D. C. Dennett. Nelle conclusioni si cercherà di verificare se in questa parabola permanga ancora qualcosa di impensato o, per usare le parole di Esposito, «qualcosa di irriducibile alla grande riduzione».
L'origine dell'io. Il "mistero" dell'intelligenza da Darwin al riduzionismo contemporaneo
Antonio Lombardi
2023-01-01
Abstract
The paper focuses on the thesis advanced by Constantino Esposito in the third chapter of "The Nihilism of Our Time", according to which “intelligence” is one of the prominent factors within contemporary nihilism. In particular, the article investigates the tendency of evolutionary-based reductionism, which “seeks to solve the problem of the self by eliminating the question, that is, by denying the fact that it is a problem”. To this end, a historical-reconstructive approach will be taken, tracing how the nature of consciousness and intelligence has been thematized by evolutionary thought, from Darwin to the most recent positions in the philosophy of mind. The survey will be carried out in three stages: 1) the origin of human intelligence and consciousness according to Darwin, who, although from his peculiar materialistic perspective, conceives of it as a “mystery”; 2) the epiphenomenalist and emergentist paradigm in the thought of G.H. Lewes and T.H. Huxley, among the first to apply Darwinian categories to the study of the human mind; 3) the contemporary reductionist and computational paradigm in the neo-Darwinian thought of authors such as R. Dawkins and D.C. Dennett. In the conclusions, an attempt will be made to ascertain whether something unthought of or, in Esposito’s words, “something irreducible to the great reduction” remains in this parable.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


