It is estimated that half of all the water extracted, both in developed and developing countries, is unauthorized. This phenomenon makes the management of a groundwater even more difficult to avoid over-exploitation. To study the interaction between farmers, that could be compliant and non-compliant, and a water agency, we built a leader-follower differential game. However, we assumed that the water agency does not know neither ex-ante nor ex-post the number of compliant farmers. After illustrating the results of the dynamic game through numerical simulation using the Western La Mancha (Spain) data, we endogenize the types' choice in an evolutionary context. Finally, we perform comparative dynamics in the steady state to understand the role of the sanction to counter illegal behaviors.
Groundwater management and illegality in a differential-evolutionary framework
Biancardi, M;Villani, Giovanni
2023-01-01
Abstract
It is estimated that half of all the water extracted, both in developed and developing countries, is unauthorized. This phenomenon makes the management of a groundwater even more difficult to avoid over-exploitation. To study the interaction between farmers, that could be compliant and non-compliant, and a water agency, we built a leader-follower differential game. However, we assumed that the water agency does not know neither ex-ante nor ex-post the number of compliant farmers. After illustrating the results of the dynamic game through numerical simulation using the Western La Mancha (Spain) data, we endogenize the types' choice in an evolutionary context. Finally, we perform comparative dynamics in the steady state to understand the role of the sanction to counter illegal behaviors.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.