TRADIZIONE, VIRTU' E RETORICA

Does a version of virtue ethics develop within a singular tradition? Is it possible to provide a conception of the life in a polis (a political community) without appealing to a theory of virtue? In the contemporary debate, sometimes the notion of virtue is considered outdated; on the contrary, some authors, such as A. MacIntyre, responsible for the revival of the virtue ethics, put forth the idea that there are incommensurable philosophical traditions and that, as a consequence, there are incommunicable catalogues of virtues. The reaction of thinkers wedded to the liberal tradition, such as J. Rawls, W. Galston and P. Macedo, focuses on the importance of certain liberal virtues, typical of a pluralistic conception the good. However, also this tradition proves to be weak, since it does not develop an ethics of human character. A compelling argument for an Aristotelian virtue ethics can be found in Aristotle Rhetoric. Rhetoric relies on the ideals of justice and truth and proves to be a fundamental factor of the process of decision making in politics (in general, in the broader context of the social life). The most important features of the orator’s persuasiveness are logical arguments, phronesis and, in general, virtues and benevolence (1378 a 8). According to Aristotle, the social process of decision making is efficient within a tradition only if it is supported by an ethics of character. In this view, phronesis has great importance and requires a deep analysis, also in relation to juridical reasoning.