Schelling’s opus, Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom, represents a moment of transition between two phases of thought. One of the indications of this transition is represented by the problem of freedom, which can, indeed must, be considered from two different perspectives. In the Philosophical Inquiries (1809) the investigations focus mainly on human freedom as the concrete pos- sibility of choosing between Good and Evil. In later reflections, at- tention shifts increasingly toward the freedom of the Absolute, that is, God’s freedom. The aim of this paper is to trace the different fate of these two aspects of Schelling’s inquiries into freedom, recalling briefly a few of the main junctures in which one or the other seems to emerge. Through references to Schopenhauer, Heidegger and Par- eyson – thinkers whose presence is virtually mandatory in any ap- proach to the history of the reception of Schelling’s thought – two substantially different attitudes appear in Schelling’s legacy on the theme of freedom. One is an attitude of diffidence and suspicion, as far as human freedom in the early post-Idealist period is concerned; the other is a more open theoretical engagement, as far as meta-hu- man freedom – God’s freedom and its origins – in 20th century thought is concerned.

Liberté de l'homme, liberté de Dieu: l'héritage schellingien

STRUMMIELLO, Giuseppina
2015

Abstract

Schelling’s opus, Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom, represents a moment of transition between two phases of thought. One of the indications of this transition is represented by the problem of freedom, which can, indeed must, be considered from two different perspectives. In the Philosophical Inquiries (1809) the investigations focus mainly on human freedom as the concrete pos- sibility of choosing between Good and Evil. In later reflections, at- tention shifts increasingly toward the freedom of the Absolute, that is, God’s freedom. The aim of this paper is to trace the different fate of these two aspects of Schelling’s inquiries into freedom, recalling briefly a few of the main junctures in which one or the other seems to emerge. Through references to Schopenhauer, Heidegger and Par- eyson – thinkers whose presence is virtually mandatory in any ap- proach to the history of the reception of Schelling’s thought – two substantially different attitudes appear in Schelling’s legacy on the theme of freedom. One is an attitude of diffidence and suspicion, as far as human freedom in the early post-Idealist period is concerned; the other is a more open theoretical engagement, as far as meta-hu- man freedom – God’s freedom and its origins – in 20th century thought is concerned.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11586/29766
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