In this paper, we propose a model describing the commercial exploitation of a common renewable resource by a population of strategically interacting agents. Players can cooperate or compete; cooperators maximize the payoﬀ of their group while defectors maximize their own proﬁt. The partition of the players into two groups, defectors and cooperators, results from the players’ choices, so it is not predetermined. This partition is decided as a Nash equilibrium of a static game. It is shown that diﬀerent types of players can exist in an equilibrium; more precisely, depending on the parameter values such as resource stock, cost, and so on, there might be equilibria only with defectors, cooperators, or with a combination of cooperators and defectors. In any case the total harvest depends on the renewable resource stock, so it inﬂuences agents’ positions. It is assumed that at each time period the agents harvest according to Nash equilibrium, which can be combined with a dynamic model describing the evolution of ﬁsh population. A complete analysis of the equilibria is presented and their stability is analysed. The eﬀect of the diﬀerent Nash equilibria on the stability of the ﬁsh stock, showing that full cooperation is the most stable case, is examined. Key Words: Nash equilibria, resource exploitation, population dynamics.
|Titolo:||Competition and Cooperation in a dynamical model of natural resources.|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2010|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|
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