This paper evaluates the effect of two policy changes on the efﬁciency of Italian regional governments in the provision of health care services: ﬁrst a change in the electoral system, second a process of ﬁscal decentralisation. The paper provides two main contributions: (1) a comprehensive analysis of the two main reforms that involved Italian regional governments and the health care sector during the 1990s, (2) the evaluation of the impact of the electoral reform in a quasi-experimental setting. Final results are in line with recent theoretical predictions that show a positive relationship between government efﬁciency and the electoral accountability enhanced by institutions such as electoral rules and ﬁscal decentralisation.
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|Titolo:||Electoral Accountability and Local Government Efficiency: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From the Italian Health Care Sector Reforms|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2014|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|