Il principio di proporzionalità tra prezzo inefficiente e inefficienza delle regole: l'esempio della regulation bancaria.

One of the most important problem of the Italian banks (like of the main European banks) today is the disposal of non performing loans, due to the gap between the book value of bad loans and the (lower) price that specialized operators (generally international hedge funds and investment banks), acting as buyers on secondary market, are willing to pay. This papaer shows that the current European regulation produce powerful disincentive for bank to sell NPLs, because it takes an inefficient parameter in to account for evaluating the capital ratios: the secondary market sale price. Thus, the choice of that price, as benchmark for estimate the capital ratios, generate a result that is not efficient: disproportionate costs to the real riskiness (of each bad loan). In this situation the implementation of action able to handle the economic inefficiency should be put in place for containing the impact of the massive NPLs sale on the capital ratios and to avoid disincentives to the bad loans disposal, giving new impulse to the securitization process. The principle of proportionality, provided by Regulation EU no 575/2013 of the European Parliament and Council, must be taken in to account for improving the economic efficiency of the system.