The Routes of the Empires: Italy and the Indipendence of Egypt.

The strategic axis between the Black Sea and the Red Sea ultimately remained the horizon of potential expansion for Italian foreign policy. Far more towards Suez rather than towards Gibraltar could explain the Italian ambition and the significant one: "... March of Italy towards the ocean against Great Britain and France". On closer inspection, this axis was the continuation of the Po-Danube line already perceived by Cavour's diplomacy as a great foreign policy director of the Kingdom of Sardinia. Of course, this is also and above all the story of the progressive reduction of the power that the Ottoman empire suffers and seeks contrast in the century between the first French empire and the first world conflict, and the relative replacement to it, in this growing "void of power ”, of the other Powers of the European concert, both through the instrument of the alliance and through that of the conflict. The Italian Navy of its beginnings does not focus on the major problems of naval power and maritime strategy, but was and wanted to be primarily an instrument of defense of the coasts of the country. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that it ever possessed the "command of the sea", intended in the sense of the dominion of the sea sufficient to transport a significant force of the military expedition through the waters without the risk of incurring serious losses. In fact, this was not fully achieved even in the Second World War, if one considers, for example, the difficulties of supplying the forces that fought in northern Africa. Too much luck has had the passage of a report by a British naval officer on the Italian fleet in 1892: I do not know what is amiss with the Italian Navy. It is not in ships; it is not in officers… it is not in science… it is not in pluck and hard work; it is not in seamanship ... Yet there is something amiss, something that I can't help being conscious of. And the upshot of it all is, that if I had a heavy job on hand here, I would rather. Even if I had a very inferior force of my own, attempt it without than with Italian help ". Of course what was lacking in the Italian Navy, and which negatively affected the British observer, was the lack of the type and profile of military tradition proper, for example, of the Royal Navy, and, of course, for the young Navy of a young country, "Last of the Great Powers", it could not be otherwise. I firmly believe that following the direction of maritime power certainly does not reveal, but unequivocally clarifies the essential pillars of the perimeter of Italian foreign policy of the era of imperialism: with England always, in the Triple with some critical points, against France if necessary. It is hardly necessary to recall, in conclusion, that maritime power, whether imperialist or not, was among the absolute priorities in the dynamics of international relations of the time in question, given that the resolution of these problems led to the formation of the Triple Understanding, while the unresolved Anglo-German naval rivalry led to the First World War.