Scholars of Medieval theology and philosophy agree that Scotus’ doctrine of univocity of being is a “point of no return”. After the formulation of this doctrine, in fact, the supporters of analogy were pushed to review and reformulate their views according to some of the standpoints on which Scotus’ univocity of being was based. Using this general interpretation as a starting point, the present paper aims to shed light on the way Dominic of Flanders reformulated his view on analogy after Scotus formulated his doctrine of univocity of being. The results of the present investigation show that by the end of 15th century the confrontation between analogy and univocity does not end up in excluding one of the two, but rather in a new formulation of each of these doctrines starting from the standpoints that they shared. In this regard Dominic of Flanders is a relevant case-study : on the one hand, he vehemently defends the basic assumptions of the analogy against the implications of univocity ; on the other hand, while acknowledging the relevance of some of Scotus’ assumptions, he attempts to find a likely agreement – even if only apparent – between analogy and univocity.
|Titolo:||L'analogia tomista alla prova: Domenico di Fiandra|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2016|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|