We analysed dyads strategies in one-shot public goods game. By means of a laboratory experiment, using a variant of the strategy-method we found that more than a third of the dyads are conditional cooperators, whereas 18% can be categorised as free riders.

Is dyads’ behaviour conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

Andrea Morone
;
TEMERARIO, TIZIANA
2018-01-01

Abstract

We analysed dyads strategies in one-shot public goods game. By means of a laboratory experiment, using a variant of the strategy-method we found that more than a third of the dyads are conditional cooperators, whereas 18% can be categorised as free riders.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
MPRA_paper_74732.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Documento in Pre-print
Licenza: Creative commons
Dimensione 497.77 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
497.77 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11586/210319
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 3
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact