We analysed dyads strategies in one-shot public goods game. By means of a laboratory experiment, using a variant of the strategy-method we found that more than a third of the dyads are conditional cooperators, whereas 18% can be categorised as free riders.
Is dyads’ behaviour conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Andrea Morone
;TEMERARIO, TIZIANA
2018-01-01
Abstract
We analysed dyads strategies in one-shot public goods game. By means of a laboratory experiment, using a variant of the strategy-method we found that more than a third of the dyads are conditional cooperators, whereas 18% can be categorised as free riders.File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
MPRA_paper_74732.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Documento in Pre-print
Licenza:
Creative commons
Dimensione
497.77 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
497.77 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
