In this book, we attempt to widen the narrow definition of rationality, which leads, according to game theory, to sub-optimal results (see the prisoner’s dilemma). Altruism occupies a particular role in the ‘non-orthodox’ analysis of rationality. To carry out this issue, we analyse Elster's conception of rationality, which includes the option of being irrational as one of the choices open to the rational subject. We also explore the possibility that rational grounds can be the foundation of collective action. Sociological literature, across the works of Pizzorno, Hirschmann, Bourdieu, has been used to demonstrate a collective action theory based on action rational in respect to value.
Altruism and Social Capital
SALVATI, ARMIDA
2008-01-01
Abstract
In this book, we attempt to widen the narrow definition of rationality, which leads, according to game theory, to sub-optimal results (see the prisoner’s dilemma). Altruism occupies a particular role in the ‘non-orthodox’ analysis of rationality. To carry out this issue, we analyse Elster's conception of rationality, which includes the option of being irrational as one of the choices open to the rational subject. We also explore the possibility that rational grounds can be the foundation of collective action. Sociological literature, across the works of Pizzorno, Hirschmann, Bourdieu, has been used to demonstrate a collective action theory based on action rational in respect to value.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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