The role of groups of producers, acting as private bodies in the regulation of agricultural and food markets, in EU legislation is becoming more impor- tant than in the past, mainly as a consequence of the reduction of public intervention in market regu- lation. In the framework of the quality scheme regu- lation 1151/12, the European Union acknowledges the importance of groups representing businesses operators, involved in the governance of member activities. Their role in promoting and preserving the quality of products balance the lack of compulsory public intervention in the protection of designation of origin toward implementing the extra UE market of quality products. However, European Union does not withdrawal her control on private subjects with public functions. The magnitude of controls increases with private rules conflicting with free competition. Therefore, entrusting private bodies in the definition of binding rules extended to the quality producers within the geographical area, art. 150 and 172 of Reg. 1308/13 provide a set of limits and a double check, by Member State and the Commission, to evaluate the effects of these rules on the market. Conversely, referring to private inspection bodies, acting instead of public bodies, legislative rules should prevent the risk that they operate as “busi- ness operators on the markets” rather than public bodies with public functions.
Gruppi di produttori ed enti di certificazione: competenze e legittimazione in una regolazione mobile
CANFORA, Irene
2015-01-01
Abstract
The role of groups of producers, acting as private bodies in the regulation of agricultural and food markets, in EU legislation is becoming more impor- tant than in the past, mainly as a consequence of the reduction of public intervention in market regu- lation. In the framework of the quality scheme regu- lation 1151/12, the European Union acknowledges the importance of groups representing businesses operators, involved in the governance of member activities. Their role in promoting and preserving the quality of products balance the lack of compulsory public intervention in the protection of designation of origin toward implementing the extra UE market of quality products. However, European Union does not withdrawal her control on private subjects with public functions. The magnitude of controls increases with private rules conflicting with free competition. Therefore, entrusting private bodies in the definition of binding rules extended to the quality producers within the geographical area, art. 150 and 172 of Reg. 1308/13 provide a set of limits and a double check, by Member State and the Commission, to evaluate the effects of these rules on the market. Conversely, referring to private inspection bodies, acting instead of public bodies, legislative rules should prevent the risk that they operate as “busi- ness operators on the markets” rather than public bodies with public functions.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
