Public utilities have recently undergone a major process of reorganization. Competitive segments have been liberalized, (eventually) privatised and tend to evolve into partially regulated oligopolies. In the latter, former monopolists are subject to regulatory duties whereas competitors operate unregulated, although endowed with market power. Having these scenarios in mind, we propose a mechanism of partial regulation that is suitable for private Cournot oligopolies. Iterated over time, this scheme, which relies upon data about current costs and past performance, converges to the equilibrium of a Nash-Cournot mixed oligopoly.
Regolamentazione Parziale di Quantità
VINELLA, ANNALISA
2007-01-01
Abstract
Public utilities have recently undergone a major process of reorganization. Competitive segments have been liberalized, (eventually) privatised and tend to evolve into partially regulated oligopolies. In the latter, former monopolists are subject to regulatory duties whereas competitors operate unregulated, although endowed with market power. Having these scenarios in mind, we propose a mechanism of partial regulation that is suitable for private Cournot oligopolies. Iterated over time, this scheme, which relies upon data about current costs and past performance, converges to the equilibrium of a Nash-Cournot mixed oligopoly.File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
