



Review

What do clinicians mean by epidemics' preparedness

Michele Bartoletti^{1,2,*}, Linda Bussini², Davide Fiore Bavaro³, Valeria Cento^{1,4}¹ Department of Biomedical Sciences, Humanitas University, Pieve Emanuele, Italy² Infectious Disease Unit, IRCCS Humanitas Research Hospital, Rozzano, Milan, Italy³ Clinic of Infectious Diseases, Department of Precision and Regenerative Medicine and Ionian Area (DiMePre-J), University of Bari "Aldo Moro", Bari, Italy⁴ Microbiology, IRCCS Humanitas Research Hospital, Rozzano, Milan, Italy

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 20 January 2023

Received in revised form

12 May 2023

Accepted 14 May 2023

Available online 15 June 2023

Editor: L. Leibovici

Keywords:

COVID-19

Epidemics

Infectious disease doctors

Mental health

Preparedness

ABSTRACT

Background: Infectious disease pandemics and epidemics pose significant global threats, and the risk of emerging infectious diseases has increased because of factors such as international connections, travel, and population density. Despite investments in global health surveillance, much of the world remains unprepared to manage infectious disease threats.

Objectives: This review article discusses the general considerations and lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of epidemic preparedness.

Sources: Non-systematic search on PubMed, scientific society websites, and scientific newspapers (performed in April 2023).

Content: Key factors for preparedness include robust public health infrastructure, adequate allocation of resources, and effective communication between stakeholders. This narrative review emphasizes the need for timely and accurate dissemination of medical knowledge, as well as addressing the challenges of misinformation and infodemics. It also highlights the importance of quick availability of diagnostic tests and vaccines, ensuring equitable access to these technologies. The role of scientific coordination in developing treatment strategies and the safety and mental well-being of healthcare workers are discussed. Lastly, it should be emphasized the need for medical training, multidisciplinary teams, new technologies and artificial intelligence, and the active role of infectious disease physicians in epidemic preparedness efforts.

Implications: From clinicians' perspective, healthcare authorities play a crucial role in epidemic preparedness even by providing resource management plans, ensuring availability of essential supplies and training, facilitating communication, and improving safe infection management. **Michele Bartoletti, Clin Microbiol Infect 2024;30:586**

© 2023 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Epidemic preparedness: general considerations

Infectious disease (ID) pandemics and epidemics are important and continuous global treats. In the last century, the risk of emerging IDs has increased steadily in parallel with the increase of international connections and travels, over boundary trades, and livestock husbandry. In addition, epidemics and pandemics waves are associated with the increasing human population density and changing interactions between humans and wild animals [1]; in fact, if compared with the beginning of the 20th century, the global

population has triple its size, reaching 8 billion of individuals in 2022 [2].

Despite significant investments in global health surveillance and capacity building, large parts of the world are unprepared to manage ID threats. Epidemic preparedness reflects the capacity of institutions—public health authorities, health systems, and emergency response bodies—to detect, report, and respond to outbreaks to minimize possible health and economic impact [3].

First of all, key factors for epidemic preparedness include the ability of public health infrastructure to guarantee surveillance and effective tracing in case of ongoing infectious processes. Second, investments in public health systems should guarantee the adequate resource for any potential health crisis [4]. Finally, ensure the communication between stakeholders is essential to obtain

* Corresponding author. Michele Bartoletti, Infectious Disease Unit, IRCCS Humanitas Research Hospital, Via Manzoni 56, Rozzano, 20089 Milan, Italy.

E-mail address: michele.bartoletti@hunimed.eu (M. Bartoletti).

adequate risk management and diffusion of updated medical knowledge.

Because of the importance and complexity of this topic, most of available guidance and documents were developed and focus on epidemic preparedness from a national and international level. In this narrative review, some perspectives of clinicians that were on the frontline during the last COVID-19 pandemic are reported and discussed in the view of potential future epidemics.

Epidemic preparedness: lessons learned from the past

The current COVID-19 pandemic is an important stress test for many healthcare systems and their preparedness for epidemics. However, as discussed in the following paragraphs, the lesson learned from COVID-19 may be useful to provide better response to next possible pandemics (Table 1).

Clinician perspectives

Several pitfalls emerged in most pandemic epicentres since the initial phases of the COVID-19 pandemic: alarming reports from frontline clinicians described extreme shortages of drugs, ventilators, and intensive care unit beds. In fact, in a qualitative study based on interviews to groups of clinicians between April and May 2020, the most important themes emerged regarding the management of resource limitations were (a) planning for crisis capacity, (b) adapting to resource limitation, and (c) barriers to care delivery [5].

Accordingly, to manage these weaknesses of the healthcare systems, the pre-establishment of algorithms and institutional protocols, clearly describing allocations of resource, could be ensuring for physicians and may provide the best quality of care to all patients. The development of these guidelines should involve team leaders and expert of triage (e.g. intensivist and emergency department doctors) along with doctors involved directly in patients care (e.g. ID and pulmonology) [5].

Another important factor was the correct dissemination of knowledge. During the recent pandemic, we learnt that novel

scientific findings from clinical studies may be available in very fast manner. For instance, pre-print articles and press release became rapidly and widely available without proper description of data [6,7]; in this scenario, to distinguish between good-versus bad-quality data could be very difficult, and misleading information from studies with methodological flaws may not be rejected.

Along with this challenge, also the phenomenon of infodemic should be considered [8]: on the one hand, it contributes to misleading information; on the other hand, it leads to mistrust in doctors, healthcare workers (HCWs), health authorities, and destabilizes the public health response. The misuse of hydroxy-chloroquine, azithromycin, and ivermectin are only some examples of drugs that were widely used (and in some cases still used) but no longer recommended by nearly all guidelines [9–11]. Sadly, the current COVID-19 pandemic also demonstrated the unpreparedness of collectivity to understand the scientific debate, based on data and opinion exchange: the unfiltered information often resulted in either incorrect or malevolent misinterpretations when exposed to public scrutiny.

Diagnostics and vaccines availability

As demonstrated by several pandemics, especially those caused by viral infections, such as Influenza or COVID-19, key factors for outbreaks control are quick availability of diagnostic tests and vaccines: in case of new health emergencies, ensuring timely development and availability of new health technologies is critical.

However, even for well-known pathogens, these technologies could not be widely available when needed, or they could come in later phases of the outbreak, or their access could be jeopardized on the territory, especially if not supported by health authorities [12]. Referring to COVID-19 outbreak, the significant global morbidity and mortality associated with the risk of economic and social well-being fall, sped up political efforts for vaccine development and distribution at unprecedented levels [13]. In fact, the SARS-CoV2 pandemic has transformed 'research and development' (R&D) of new diagnostic tests and vaccines in a commercial priority for several pharmaceutical industries. However, this highly profitable

Table 1
Pivotal weaknesses evidenced from previous pandemics

Epidemic preparedness: lessons learned from the past	Pivotal weaknesses evidenced from previous pandemics	Main publications on the topic
Clinician perspectives	Inadequate financial resources to establish epidemics infrastructure and unpreparedness of medical and nurse staff Distinguishing between good- versus bad-quality data was very difficult because of fast articles release and availability without proper peer review processes	[6,7,13,15]
Diagnostics and vaccines availability	Occurrence of the phenomenon of infodemic, demonstrating the unpreparedness of collectivity to understand the scientific debate Absence of expanded and clearly defined roles for laboratory and diagnostic systems in infectious disease preparedness plans In low- and middle-income countries, the access to diagnostic tests and vaccination is still profoundly uneven because of the insufficient economic investments	[14,15,30]
Collective scientific coordination for development of treatment strategies	Absence of shared diagnostic and treatment guidelines (or guidance documents) developed through a dynamic, collaborative planning process; frequent fragmentation of knowledge and spreading of misconceptions No coordinate multinational research groups that could perform <i>in vitro</i> and <i>in vivo</i> studies in a timely way Scarce oversee of methodology and design of studies to guarantee that they address the urgent clinical questions	[7,9–13,17]
Ensuring safety of healthcare workers	Lack of multidimensional approach to ensure mental well-being of the healthcare workers, including safety policies, guidelines, staff testing, and staff illness protocols Paucity of pre-established pathways to short- and long-term mental health services to effectively handle depression and post-traumatic stress disorder	[21,23–27]

market opportunity will probably fall back into an area of marketing failure when massive public investments and other policy interventions will be reduced.

As an example of this possible scenario, in low- and middle-income countries, the access to diagnostic tests and vaccination is still profoundly uneven because of the insufficient economic investment, leading to inequity to the population health and a significant impact on economic recovery [14].

Therefore, this recent pandemic taught us the importance of coordinate public investments and policies to guarantee the wide access to diagnostic tests and vaccines, as well as R&D support at any level, including long-term financial sustainability of vaccines and diagnostics development [15].

Collective scientific coordination for development of treatment strategies

In responding to severity of SARS-CoV2 disease, several scientific societies tried to develop effective treatment strategies, including both non-pharmaceutical interventions (e.g. appropriate use of non-invasive and ventilation techniques) and pharmaceutical guidelines. However, excluding the very early weeks of pandemic, there was a subsequent development of multiple treatment strategies and guidance documents, mainly based on expert opinions and small case series, often burdened by serious methodological flaws [7]. As a consequence, several drugs were used on patients without sufficient data on their efficacy causing more harms than benefits [8–10].

Accordingly, this recent pandemic taught how expert opinions and articles published on scientific journals as well as congresses could serve as tools to exchange knowledge but also as weapons to spread misconceptions [16]. In this sense, the role of scientific societies in future pandemics should focus on: (a) define which type of pharmaceutical interventions may be adequately supported by data and could be tested in clinical studies; (b) oversee the methodology and design of studies to guarantee that they address the urgent clinical questions; (c) coordinate the establishment of multinational research groups that could perform *in vitro* and *in vivo* studies in a timely way; (d) secure the optimal distribution and application on data deriving from studies and ensure development of further studies and interventions. These activities are important both to spread correct knowledge and facilitate optimal allocation of treatments.

However, it is easier said than done. When serious epidemics arise, and thousands of people get infected and hospital collapse under the request of assistance, coordinate and collaborative works become very difficult. Hence, a serious responsibility is needed from clinicians, academic, and public researchers, often competing for funding and resources, to conduct their activity bringing only the positive aspects of competitiveness and ensuring harmony and reciprocal correctness toward the production of high quality and effective studies.

Ensuring safety of HCWs

The role of HCWs in epidemics and pandemics emergency is pivotal. Sadly, many doctors, nurses, and assistants lost their lives during the first waves of COVID-19 pandemic. According to WHO data, it was estimated that between 80,000 and 180,000 HCWs could have died because of COVID-19 since the beginning of the pandemic [17]. Similarly, in the recent Uganda Ebola outbreak, up to 40% of infected HCWs died: importantly, the estimated risk of death in HCWs was significantly higher if compared with the general population. Similar data were recorded during the past Ebola outbreaks: 0.11% of Liberia's entire general population had

died because of Ebola, as compared with 8.07% of its health workers [18]. Hence, it is not surprising that in the recent COVID-19 pandemic, most HCWs experienced insecurity explained by inadequate availability personal protective equipment (PPE), the insufficient resources, and the inconsistent information [19].

Another important aspect that should be ensured to face pandemics is the mental well-being of the HCWs. Preventive strategies of mental health disorders should be quickly implemented in case of pandemics, based on lessons learned from the past.

For instance, overtiredness because of intense and unanticipated workload both during initial and later phases of pandemics should be taken in account. In addition, during the COVID-19 pandemic, HCWs were involved in important ethical decision and triage on life-support in critical patients [20]. This factor associated with the shortage of drugs, PPE, and the physical risk of contracting the infection contributed to an increase of psychological disorders [21]. Studies that explored this issue have reported a prevalence of anxiety, depression, and sleep disturbance of 29–37%, 28–35%, and 40–43%, respectively [22,23].

Consequently, a multidimensional approach should be structured to ensure mental well-being of the HCW, including both the promotion of a better self-care and the access to mental health services and social support.

At first, discussing about prevention, the basic component of well-being that should be guarantee is the full meeting of physiological daily needs, such as nutrition and hydration, adequate level of fitness, rest, and sleep [24]. However, because of shortage of staff and overworking, these self-care aspects could often be underrated for HCW. Accordingly, ensuring these self-care daily needs, even in dedicated places within the healthcare setting could be an effective preventive strategy [25].

On the other side, discussing about treatment of health disorders, providing psychological care is also pivotal. This should be made through several actions, such as early identification of 'at-risk' subjects, predisposition of available psychological or psychiatric support to HCWs, and active monitoring subjects exposed to a potentially traumatic event [25,26].

Epidemic preparedness: moving forward

In the following paragraphs, the clinician's perspective of principal needs for facing future pandemics are reported (and summarized in Fig. 1).

The role of medical training and multidisciplinary teams

One of the major issues of the recent pandemic was the unpreparedness of medical and nurse staff. Indeed, the sudden succession of events of the SARS-CoV2 pandemic had imposed on several health systems to provide a dramatically high number of health care professionals, able to face a completely 'new' disease [27].

To be prepared for future pandemics, the importance of medical and nurse training should improve with the following aspects of knowledge: (a) definition and description of known data about the pathogen, along with the routes of transmission, the diagnostic tools, and the syndromic pictures; (b) description of the main infection control and prevention strategies and/or other protection measures; (c) how to identify the official information sources; and (d) communication strategies for the population and information for health education by health professionals. Finally, all these information should be made available through different ways, including residency training, remote training courses, scientific meetings and webinars, and updated scientific papers dissemination [28].

up with the need. For example, the average number of ID doctors in European countries may vary between 4 and 53 per million of inhabitants [47]. Similarly, in the US, the national average density was 1.76 ID physicians per 100,000 persons in the 2017 with high disparity between different counties [48].

To be prepared for future pandemics, it is time to reconsider the role of ID specialists within hospitals and within the epidemic response teams. In fact, the most interesting aspect of the studies previously cited [7,12–14,36,44] was the role of ID physician not only limited to one specific task, such as diagnosis or treatment of infections. The most beneficial implementation of ID specialists was their complete inclusion in all the decision-making phases of the process of care of patients.

Hence, taking into consideration the other aspects of epidemic preparedness elucidated in previous paragraphs, it is clear that within the continuum of actions that health authorities should implement, it is fundamental that ID physicians should be precisely allocated to ensure their maximal efficiency without the risk of working overload and staff exhaustion.

Final remarks and conclusions

In our view, healthcare authorities play a crucial role in epidemic preparedness. They should provide a risk management plan for effective resource, diagnostic, and personnel management. These plans should ensure availability of PPE, diagnostics, treatments, and provide emergency training. Communication among public health authorities, hospitals, clinicians, and the scientific community should be facilitated to disseminate quality information, protocols, and optimize patient management. Hospitals and clinicians must be adaptable, participate in studies, and address mental health needs of HCWs. In addition, plans are needed to improve the quality and quantity of ID physicians for better infection management and leadership.

Author contributions

MB, LB, DFB, and VC contributed in conceptualization, literature search, writing, review, and editing the manuscript.

Transparency declaration

Conflict of interest

MB reports consulting fees from Pfizer, AstraZeneca, MSD, and Gilead; payment honoraria for lectures from Pfizer, MSD, and Gilead; and participation to advisory board for Pfizer, AstraZeneca, MSD, and Gilead. All other authors have nothing to disclose.

References

- McMichael AJ. Environmental and social influences on emerging infectious diseases: past, present and future. *Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci* 2004 Jul 29;359:1049–58. <https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2004.1480>.
- United Nations. World population prospects 2022: summary of results. 2022. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/World-Population-Prospects-2022>. [Accessed 21 December 2022].
- Oppenheim B, Gallivan M, Madhav NK, Brown N, Serhiyenko V, Wolfe ND, et al. Assessing global preparedness for the next pandemic: development and application of an Epidemic preparedness index. *BMJ Glob Health* 2019 Jan 29;4:e001157. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001157>.
- Sands P, Chawla M. Financing preparedness at a national level. *Lancet* 2017 May 27;389:2086–7. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(17\)31375-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)31375-2).
- Butler CR, Wong SPY, Wightman AG, O'Hare AM. US Clinicians' experiences and perspectives on resource limitation and patient care during the COVID-19 pandemic. *JAMA Netw Open* 2020 Nov 2;3:e2027315. <https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.27315>.
- Dobler CC. Poor quality research and clinical practice during COVID-19. *Breathe (Sheff)* 2020 Jun;16:200112. <https://doi.org/10.1183/20734735.0112-2020>.
- Jung RG, Di Santo P, Clifford C, Prosperi-Porta G, Skanes S, Hung A, et al. Methodological quality of COVID-19 clinical research. *Nat Commun* 2021 Feb 11;12:943. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-21220-5>.
- Sharma LD, Joshi KJ, Acharya TA, Dwivedi MG, Sethy GB. Infodemics during era of COVID-19 pandemic: A review of literature. *J Family Med Prim Care* 2022 Aug;11:4236–9. https://doi.org/10.4103/jfmpc.jfmpc_2446_21.
- Barac A, Azap O, Barac A, Bussini L, Ergonul O, Krause R, et al. European society of clinical microbiology and infectious diseases guidelines for coronavirus disease 2019: an update on treatment of patients with mild/moderate disease. *Clin Microbiol Infect* 2022 Dec;28:1578–90. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2022.08.013>.
- Barac A, Bartoletti M, Azap O, Bussini L, Ergonul O, Krause R, et al. Inappropriate use of ivermectin during the COVID-19 pandemic: primum non nocere! *Clin Microbiol Infect* 2022 Jul;28:908–10. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2022.03.022>.
- Himraj A, Morgan RL, Shumaker AH, Lavergne V, Baden L, Cheng VC, et al. Infectious diseases society of America guidelines on the treatment and management of patients with COVID-19. *Clin Infect Dis* 2020 Apr 27:ciaa478. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciaa478>.
- Haldane V, De Foo C, Abdalla SM, Jung AS, Tan M, Wu S, et al. Health systems resilience in managing the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons from 28 countries. *Nat Med* 2021 Jun;27:964–80. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-021-01381-y>.
- Cornwall W. Just 50% of Americans plan to get a COVID-19 vaccine. Here's how to win over the rest. 2020. <https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/06/just-50-americans-plan-get-covid-19-vaccine-here-s-how-win-over-rest>.
- Bayati M, Noroozi R, Ghanbari-Jahromi M, Jalali FS. Inequality in the distribution of Covid-19 vaccine: a systematic review. *Int J Equity Health* 2022 Aug 30;21:122. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12939-022-01729-x>.
- Lurie N, Keusch GT, Dzau VJ. Urgent lessons from COVID 19: why the world needs a standing, coordinated system and sustainable financing for global research and development. *Lancet* 2021 Mar 27;397:1229–36. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(21\)00503-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)00503-1).
- García-Alegria J, Garrido-López P, FACME Board of Directors. The role of scientific societies in a post-COVID world. *Rev Clin Esp (Barc)* 2021 Oct;221:468–9. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rceng.2021.04.004>.
- World Health Organization. The impact of COVID-19 on health and care workers: a closer look at deaths. World Health Organization; 2021. <https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/345300/WHO-HWF-WorkingPaper-2021.1-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>. [Accessed 19 December 2022].
- Nyenswah TG, Katch F, Bawo L, Massaquoi M, Gbanyan M, Fallah M, et al. Ebola and its control in Liberia, 2014–2015. *Emerg Infect Dis* 2016 Feb;22:169–77. <https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2202.151456>.
- Billings J, Ching BCF, Gkoka V, Greene T, Bloomfield M. Experiences of frontline healthcare workers and their views about support during COVID-19 and previous pandemics: a systematic review and qualitative meta-synthesis. *BMC Health Serv Res* 2021 Sep 6;21:923. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-021-06917-z>.
- Robert R, Kentish-Barnes N, Boyer A, Laurent A, Azoulay E, Reignier J. Ethical dilemmas due to the Covid-19 pandemic. *Ann Intensive Care* 2020 Jun 17;10:84. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s13613-020-00702-7>.
- Mushtaq H, Singh S, Mir M, Tekin A, Singh R, Lundeen J, et al. The well-being of healthcare workers during the COVID-19 pandemic: A narrative review. *Cureus* 2022 May 17;14:e25065. <https://doi.org/10.7759/cureus.25065>.
- Al Maqbali M, Al Sinani M, Al-Lenjawi B. Prevalence of stress, depression, anxiety and sleep disturbance among nurses during the COVID-19 pandemic: A systematic review and meta-analysis. *J Psychosom Res* 2021 Feb;141:110343. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychores.2020.110343>.
- Dragioti E, Tsartsalis D, Mentis M, Mantzoukas S, Gouva M. Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mental health of hospital staff: An umbrella review of 44 meta-analyses. *Int J Nurs Stud* 2022 Jul;131:104272. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijnurstu.2022.104272>.
- Kamran A, Naeim M, Ghobadi Bagvand S. Effective recommendations for reducing anxiety and depression caused by COVID-19 outbreak in medical staff. *Arch Psychiatr Nurs* 2020 Aug;34:192–3. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apnu.2020.06.003>.
- Halms T, Strasser M, Kunz M, Hasan A. How to reduce mental health burden in health care workers during COVID-19?—A scoping review of guideline recommendations. *Front Psychiatry* 2022 Jan 20;12:770193. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsy.2021.770193>.
- Lissoni B, Del Negro S, Brioschi P, Casella G, Fontana I, Bruni C, et al. Promoting resilience in the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic: Psychological interventions for intensive care unit (ICU) clinicians and family members. *Psychol Trauma* 2020 Aug;12:S105–7. <https://doi.org/10.1037/tra0000802>.
- Hall L, Bisset K, Lynch L, Young Y, Ruggles R, Clinical and Public Health Group, UK Health Security Agency. Training during the COVID-19 pandemic: the experience of public health registrars in the London and Kent, Surrey, Sussex training programme. *J Public Health (Oxf)*. 2023 Jun 14;45:529–34. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pubmed/fdac130>.

- [28] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, Committee on the Science of Science Communication. *A Research Agenda. Communicating Science Effectively: A Research Agenda*. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2017 Mar 8.
- [29] Haldane V, Jung AS, De Foo C, Bonk M, Jamieson M, Wu S, et al. Strengthening the basics: public health responses to prevent the next pandemic. *BMJ* 2021 Nov 28;375:e067510. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj-2021-067510>.
- [30] Fisher DA, Carson G, GOARN Steering Committee. Back to basics: the outbreak response pillars. *Lancet* 2020 Aug 29;396:598. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(20\)31760-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31760-8).
- [31] Fatiregun AA, Isere EE. Epidemic preparedness and management: A guide on Lassa fever outbreak preparedness plan. *Niger Med J* 2017 Jan-Feb;58:1–6. <https://doi.org/10.4103/0300-1652.218414>.
- [32] Mondal S, Mitra P. The role of emerging technologies to fight against COVID-19 pandemic: An exploratory review. *Trans Indian Natl Acad Eng* 2022;7:157–74. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41403-022-00322-6>.
- [33] Wang L, Zhang Y, Wang D, Tong X, Liu T, Zhang S, et al. Artificial intelligence for COVID-19: A systematic review. *Front Med (Lausanne)* 2021 Sep 30;8:704256. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fmed.2021.704256>.
- [34] Viale P, Tedeschi S, Scudeller L, Attard L, Badia L, Bartoletti M, et al. Infectious diseases team for the early management of severe sepsis and septic shock in the emergency department. *Clin Infect Dis* 2017 Oct 15;65:1253–9. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/cix548>.
- [35] Goto M, Schweizer ML, Vaughan-Sarrazin MS, Perencevich EN, Livorsi DJ, Diekema DJ, et al. Association of evidence-based care Pprocesses with mortality in *Staphylococcus aureus* Bacteremia at Veterans Health Administration Hospitals, 2003–2014. *JAMA Intern Med* 2017 Oct 1;177:1489–97. <https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2017.3958>.
- [36] Bartoletti M, Tedeschi S, Scudeller L, Pascale R, Rosselli Del Turco E, Trapani F, et al. Impact on mortality of a bundle for the management of Enterococcal bloodstream infection. *Open Forum Infect Dis* 2019 Nov 4;6:ofz473. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofz473>.
- [37] Mejia-Chew C, O'Halloran JA, Olsen MA, Stwalley D, Kronen R, Lin C, et al. Effect of infectious disease consultation on mortality and treatment of patients with candida bloodstream infections: a retrospective, cohort study. *Lancet Infect Dis* 2019 Dec;19:1336–44. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099\(19\)30405-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(19)30405-0).
- [38] Chesdachai S, Kline S, Helmin D, Rajasingham R. The Effect of Infectious Diseases Consultation on Mortality in Hospitalized Patients With Methicillin-Resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*, *Candida*, and *Pseudomonas* Bloodstream Infections. *Open Forum Infect Dis* 2020 Jan 11;7:ofaa010. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofaa010>.
- [39] Hasegawa S, Kakiuchi S, Tholany J, Kobayashi T, Marra AR, Schweizer ML, et al. Impact of infectious diseases consultation among patients with infections caused by gram-negative rod bacteria: a systematic literature review and meta-analysis. *Infect Dis (Lond)*. 2022 Aug;54:618–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23744235.2022.2056242>.
- [40] Bartoletti M, Antonelli A, Bussini L, Corcione S, Giacobbe DR, Marconi L, et al. Clinical consequences of very major errors with semi-automated testing systems for antimicrobial susceptibility of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacterales. *Clin Microbiol Infect* 2022 Sep;28:1290.e1–4. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2022.03.013>.
- [41] Bavaro DF, De Gennaro N, Belati A, Diella L, Papagni R, Frallonardo L, et al. Impact of a pro-active infectious disease consultation on the management of a multidrug-resistant organisms outbreak in a COVID-19 Hospital: A three-months Quasi-experimental study. *Antibiotics (Basel)* 2023 Apr 6;12:712. <https://doi.org/10.3390/antibiotics12040712>.
- [42] Ostrowsky B, Banerjee R, Bonomo RA, Cosgrove SE, Davidson L, Doron S, et al. Infectious Diseases Society of America, Pediatric Infectious Diseases Society, and the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America. Infectious diseases physicians: Leading the way in antimicrobial stewardship. *Clin Infect Dis* 2018 Mar 19;66:995–1003. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/cix1093>.
- [43] Hamandi B, Husain S, Humar A, Papadimitropoulos EA. Impact of infectious disease consultation on the clinical and economic outcomes of solid organ transplant recipients admitted for infectious complications. *Clin Infect Dis* 2014 Oct 15;59:1074–82. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciu522>.
- [44] Bavaro DF, Pizzutilo P, Catino A, Signorile F, Pesola F, Di Gennaro F, et al. Incidence of infections and predictors of mortality during checkpoint inhibitor immunotherapy in patients with advanced lung cancer: A retrospective cohort study. *Open Forum Infect Dis* 2021 Apr 13;8:ofab187. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ofid/ofab187>.
- [45] Pascale R, Bussini L, Gaibani P, Bovo F, Fornaro G, Lombardo D, et al. Carbapenem-resistant bacteria in an intensive care unit during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic: A multicenter before-and-after cross-sectional study. *Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol* 2022 Apr;43:461–6. <https://doi.org/10.1017/ice.2021.144>.
- [46] Khan S, Hasan SS, Bond SE, Conway BR, Aldeyab MA. Antimicrobial consumption in patients with COVID-19: a systematic review and meta-analysis. *Expert Rev Anti Infect Ther* 2022 May;20:749–72. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14787210.2022.2011719>.
- [47] Brockhoff RA, Hicks SR, Salmanton-García J, Dušek D, Stahl JP, Beeching NJ, et al. Training in infectious diseases across Europe in 2021 - a survey on training delivery, content and assessment. *Clin Microbiol Infect* 2021 Nov;27:1693.e1–8. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2021.07.033>.
- [48] Walensky RP, McQuillen DP, Shahbazi S, Goodson JD. Where is the ID in COVID-19? *Ann Intern Med* 2020 Oct 6;173:587–9. <https://doi.org/10.7326/M20-2684>.