International Criminal Law (ICL). Given that there is already quite a lot of literature on UJ, it is important to focus the research on the issue of fragmentation and/or unity rather than to deal with the issue of UJ more generally. I will focus on this topic in sections 1 and 2, explaining some cursory remarks to these issues in my analysis on fragmentation. In the introduction, I will briefly introduce UJ as a controversial form of jurisdiction, but still necessary given that territorial jurisdiction does not always function well in the case of international crime. I will demonstrate that many state parties to the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute have vested or reconfirmed UJ for the core crimes when implementing the ICC Statute. The leading question of my research is whether this practice has led or has the potential to lead to unity or rather to fragmentation within ICL. In the research I will approach this question from different perspectives. In section 1 I will examine how State parties have may actually enacted universal jurisdiction for the core crimes, with a view to determining whether there is indeed some unity on this front or whether the practice on this matter is actually rather diverse (or fragmented). Subsequently, I will analyse which conditions States have formulated for the exercise of UJ, and whether this practice is consistent (unity) or again rather diverse (fragmentation). It might also be interesting to see whether States have different conditions for UJ over core crimes than over other international or transnational crimes, which would be a sign of real fragmentation between modern ICL (the core crimes) and transnational ICL (crimes such as terrorism, piracy, money counterfeiting, etc.). In section 2, on the basis of a few selected case studies, I will ask whether the exercise of UJ has the tendency to lead to fragmented jurisprudence on substantive ICL. I will try to answer: Do States in their implementation of legislation and subsequently the national courts use the same crime definitions as the ICC, or are they generally different and tailored to domestic circumstances? And those questions arise even more strongly for modes of liability? If the latter is the case, to what extent is the jurisprudence fragmented – is it on minor points, or do we see great divergences in case law on crime definitions? Finally, I will make some final observations on the utility of UJ and whether in general it will lead to further fragmentation within ICL, with my personal interpretation of ideal UJ.

Universal Jurisdiction between Unity and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law

PASCULLI, MARIA ANTONELLA
2011-01-01

Abstract

International Criminal Law (ICL). Given that there is already quite a lot of literature on UJ, it is important to focus the research on the issue of fragmentation and/or unity rather than to deal with the issue of UJ more generally. I will focus on this topic in sections 1 and 2, explaining some cursory remarks to these issues in my analysis on fragmentation. In the introduction, I will briefly introduce UJ as a controversial form of jurisdiction, but still necessary given that territorial jurisdiction does not always function well in the case of international crime. I will demonstrate that many state parties to the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute have vested or reconfirmed UJ for the core crimes when implementing the ICC Statute. The leading question of my research is whether this practice has led or has the potential to lead to unity or rather to fragmentation within ICL. In the research I will approach this question from different perspectives. In section 1 I will examine how State parties have may actually enacted universal jurisdiction for the core crimes, with a view to determining whether there is indeed some unity on this front or whether the practice on this matter is actually rather diverse (or fragmented). Subsequently, I will analyse which conditions States have formulated for the exercise of UJ, and whether this practice is consistent (unity) or again rather diverse (fragmentation). It might also be interesting to see whether States have different conditions for UJ over core crimes than over other international or transnational crimes, which would be a sign of real fragmentation between modern ICL (the core crimes) and transnational ICL (crimes such as terrorism, piracy, money counterfeiting, etc.). In section 2, on the basis of a few selected case studies, I will ask whether the exercise of UJ has the tendency to lead to fragmented jurisprudence on substantive ICL. I will try to answer: Do States in their implementation of legislation and subsequently the national courts use the same crime definitions as the ICC, or are they generally different and tailored to domestic circumstances? And those questions arise even more strongly for modes of liability? If the latter is the case, to what extent is the jurisprudence fragmented – is it on minor points, or do we see great divergences in case law on crime definitions? Finally, I will make some final observations on the utility of UJ and whether in general it will lead to further fragmentation within ICL, with my personal interpretation of ideal UJ.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11586/40621
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